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In April 2008, the Québec Court of Appeal in Hocking c. 
Haziza1 refused to recognize and enforce an Ontario Court 
judgment because it disagreed with how the Ontario judge decided 
the case, and found the judgment to be incompatible with 
fundamental principles of Québec law.2  By this ruling, the Court 
implicitly sought to change not just class action culture, but legal 
                                                                                                             
1. Hocking c. Haziza, (2008), QCCA 800 (CanLII).  This class action arose 
from a motion for certification filed by Robert Hocking against HSBC Bank on 
behalf of all Canadian customers of HSBC who had made an early pay-out of 
their mortgage and consequently incurred a penalty.  David Haziza, a Québec 
resident, filed a similar motion in Québec, limiting the class to Québec residents 
only.  The Ontario Court approved the class action for settlement purposes a few 
months later. Accordingly, the Ontario decision at stake was an order certifying 
a multi-jurisdictional class action for settlement purposes.  The Québec Superior 
Court concluded that the Ontario Court had no jurisdiction over class members 
residing in Québec.  In her reasons upholding the Superior Court decision, the 
Court of Appeal stated that the Ontario Court had no right to get involved in 
defining the rights and liabilities of residents of another province, and that the 
territorial limits on the scope of provincial legislative authority prevented the 
application of the law of a province to matters that were not sufficiently 
connected to it.  The Court of Appeal held that the Ontario judgment failed to 
meet the requirements of the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC for recognition and 
enforcement of personal actions of a patrimonial nature. Interestingly, it 
concluded that the Ontario judgment was rendered in violation of the essential 
principles that govern civil proceedings in Québec since the interests of the non-
resident class members were not taken into consideration by the Court, and the 
adequate notice requirements regarding the proposed settlement were not met.   
2.  Id. at ¶. 223 et seq. (“. . . je suis également d'avis que le jugement 
ontarien, en l'espèce, a été rendu en violation des principes essentiels de la 
procédure, au sens de l'article 3155, paragr. 3, C.C.Q., en ce que la juge saisie du 
recours collectif et, au même moment, de la ratification d'un règlement amiable, 
n'a pas examiné la question de savoir ce qu'il en était des intérêts des non-
résidents (dont les Québécois) visés par le recours, de la protection de leurs 
intérêts et de sa propre compétence sur ces justiciables.”). 
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norms applicable in that area of law.  Indeed, it recognized the 
importance of protecting class action members’ rights by notifying 
them appropriately about proposed settlements through extensive 
notice requirements.3  Accordingly, Hocking illustrates how one 
Canadian province’s legal culture influences class action law 
developments and how class actions and their applicable law can, 
reciprocally, influence and affect culture.  
In this paper, I will first review the different theories of law 
and culture, and define the concept and breadth of legal culture.  
Second, I will discuss the relationship between law and culture, 
referring to the existing literature on the subject.  I will also discuss 
how authors have connected culture to civil procedure, and why 
the concept of “modern legal culture” is important in the context of 
class action law.  Third, I will address the main thesis of my paper: 
the cultural construction of class action law.  I will argue that the 
class action encourages the transmission of culture, and discuss 
how the history of the North American class action was influenced 
by culture.  I will thereafter argue that the class action mirrors 
society’s structure and culture, in light of the following three 
characteristics of North American contemporary culture: access to 
justice, managerial judging and the preference for settlements.  
Fourth, I will argue that class actions affect North American legal 
culture, as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions, in the 
role of judges and in the legal profession.  Last, I will argue that 
the cross-constitutive relationship between class action law and 
culture must be studied both theoretically and empirically.  
 Ultimately, I will demonstrate that the class action is a 
disputing institution that is culturally constructed, that plays a role 
in the construction and transmission of culture–that is, of social 
arrangements, systems of beliefs and values. This project is 
ambitious, but distinctive as no author has to my knowledge 
related class action law to culture in such a way.4 
                                                                                                             
3. Id. at ¶228 et seq. 
4. But see, Steven Penney, Mass Torts, Mass Culture: Canadian Mass Tort 
Law and Hollywood Narrative Film, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 205 (2004) (where the 
author argues that Canadian mass tort law may be influenced by American 
popular culture, and in particular by Hollywood films) and Carole Younes, Le 
recours collectif québécois: les réalités collectives à travers le prisme du droit, 
15 R.C.D.S. 111,130 (2000).  Many authors, however, have examined the 
relationship between civil procedure law and culture. See, notably, Daniel Jutras, 
Culture et droit processuel: Le cas du Québec (2008) (unpublished, on file with 
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II. THE THEORIES OF CULTURE 
 
A.  Cultivating Law 
 
Culture is important to our understanding of legal systems.  But 
what exactly do we mean by “culture?”  It is a vague, “amorphous 
and diffuse”5 concept that can include both a local culture–such as 
the Québecois culture, for instance–and a more global one–such as 
the North American culture.  Moreover, it occasionally is 
compared to or confused with the concepts of tradition6 and 
civilization.7 
In fact, the word “culture” originates from the Latin cultura, 
stemming from colere, which means “to cultivate.”8  The 
dictionary defines culture as “[t]he distinctive ideas, customs, 
social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular society, 
                                                                                                             
 
author); ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMÉRIQUE 
ET EN FRANCE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2003); ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER–
ESSAI SUR LE RITUAL JUDICIAIRE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2001); Mauro 
Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure–Reforms and 
Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1971).  Finally, 
Professor Francisco Valdes of the University of Miami School of Law has 
recently written about class actions and social justice in his article entitled, 
Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627 (2008) (where 
Professor Valdes concludes that “consideration of bedrock social and legal 
values . . . can help point the way toward a systemic, principled solution to basic 
questions of power, policy, and procedure associated with class action 
controversies.”)  Valdes’ focus, however, is different from mine, as he 
principally seeks to explore why the class action has moved from a “venerable 
fixture of procedure” to a device increasingly under attack. 
5. Rodney MacDonald, Civil Justice Reform Working Group, Discussion 
Paper presented at the Civil Justice Reform Working Group, February 23, 2005, 
BRITISH COLUMBIA JUSTICE REVIEW, available at 
http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/civil_justice/cjrwg_paper_02_
23_05.pdf  (last visited September 26, 2009). 
6. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 3 et seq. (3d ed. 
2007).  Glenn defines tradition as principally including the transmission of 
information. 
7. Loïc Cadiet, Droit et culture, Journées Louisianaises, Association Henri 
Capitant 2008, at 3.  
8. DOUGLAS HARPER, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 2001 (“Culture”), 
available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=culture (last visited 
August 21, 2009).    
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people, or period.”9  The UNESCO refers to culture “as the set of 
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of 
society or a social group, and . . . to art and literature, lifestyles, 
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”10  
When we think of legal culture, we generally refer not so much 
to rituals, systems of belief and habit, language and religion, but to 
norms of behaviour such as law and morality.  Accordingly, law is 
no doubt part of a given society’s culture.  And, as will be argued 
in this paper, this given society’s culture explains, creates, and is 
influenced by its legal system. 
Legal academics have acknowledged that the definition of legal 
culture is flexible, and may vary depending on the purpose of the 
one defining it.11  Lawrence Friedman, for instance, has defined 
legal culture as the:  
. . . [I]deas, values, attitudes, and opinions people in some 
society hold, with regard to law and the legal system.  
Every person has a ‘legal culture,’ just as every person has 
a general culture, and a social culture; every person has 
individual, unique traits, as distinctive as his or her 
fingerprints; but each person is at the same time part of a 
collective, a group, a social entity, and shares in the ideas 
and habits of that group.  
Legal culture is the source of law–its norms create the legal 
norms; and it is what determines the impact of legal norms 
on society.  After all the ‘subjects’ of law, the people it 
affects, are not robots or inert lumps of clay; they are living 
human beings, with thoughts, ideas, minds, habits, 
                                                                                                             
9. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2008, s.v. “culture.” Also see the 
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 2008, s.v. “culture:” “the total 
of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the 
shared bases of social action,” or “the total range of activities and ideas of a 
group of people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by 
members of the group.” 
10.   PREAMBLE    TO    THE    UNESCO    UNIVERSAL    DECLARATION     ON  
CULTURAL DIVERSITY (2001), available at  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf  (last visited 
September 26, 2009). 
11. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE AND RITUAL 7 (2005) (noting that the 
definition of culture depends on its purposes); David Nelken, 
Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
435, 438 (1995). 
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behaviours; they react to orders and institutions of laws, 
and their reactions determine the effect of these orders and 
institutions. . . . 
Legal culture is a broad term for attitudes and opinions; the 
phenomenon shows up in the literature sometimes as ‘legal 
consciousness’ . . ., or as knowledge and opinion about law 
. . . We can measure [legal culture] directly, by asking 
people questions; or indirectly, by watching what people do 
and inferring their attitudes from what we see. . . .12 
[emphasis added] 
Oscar Chase similarly defines culture as including: “the 
‘traditional ideas, values and norms’ that are widely shared in a 
social group,” as well as “propositions of belief that are both 
normative (‘killing is wrong except when authorized by the state’) 
and cognitive (‘the earth is round’).”13  On whether culture should 
include the institutions and social arrangements that are specific to 
a community, Chase argues that “[d]isputing institutions are at 
once a product of, a contributor to, and an aspect of culture.”14  
Hence, for Chase, dispute resolution institutions both result from 
culture and influence or affect culture.   
Generally, academics have noted the difficulty of defining the 
concept of legal culture, as well as its specific scope and the 
relationship between each of its relevant elements.15  Roger 
Cotterrell, notably, has stated that, “[t]he imprecision of the 
[various formulations of legal culture] makes it hard to see what 
                                                                                                             
12. Lawrence M. Friedman, Is There a Modern Legal Culture?, 7:2 RATIO 
JURIS 117, 118-119 (1994). 
13. CHASE, supra note 11, at 6, who quotes MELFORD E. SPIRO, CULTURE 
AND HUMAN NATURE  viii, 32 (1994).  See also Oscar G. Chase, Legal 
Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (1997) (“. 
. . the culture of a community of people includes those beliefs about how to 
properly relate to each other that are deeply held, widely shared, and persistent 
over time.”). 
14. CHASE, supra note 11, at 7. 
15. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY–LEGAL IDEAS IN 
THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 83 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2006).  See also 
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17 et seq.; and generally: 
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE (Denis Alland & Stéphanie Rials eds., 
2003).  
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exactly the concept covers and what the relationship is between the 
various elements said to be included within its scope.”16 
 
B. The Breadth of Legal Culture 
 
Accordingly, one major obstacle to working with the concept 
of legal culture is agreeing on exactly what it encompasses, and on 
where its limits should be drawn.  What is the most relevant social 
unit to legal culture?  Exactly which legal culture should be 
focused upon?  Indeed, as Friedman remarked, “one can speak of 
legal culture at many levels of abstraction.”17  
North American legal culture includes the legal norms 
generated by the two major prevalent systems of justice–the civil 
law, applicable in the province of Québec and in the State of 
Louisiana and U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and the common law, 
applicable in the rest of Canada and in the rest of the U.S.  It also 
includes elements of the inquisitorial and adversarial systems, 
specific to the civil and common law traditions.18  Moreover, it 
incorporates countless ideas, values and norms derived from 
provincial, state, territorial, and local (city) or regional legal 
activity.  
Is ascertaining national culture and distinguishing it from the 
more global or international culture necessary and relevant to the 
study of law?19  And if it is, what exactly must be included in 
national or local culture?  For instance, how specific to Québécois 
culture is a particular cultural trait that also exists at the North 
                                                                                                             
16. COTTERREL, supra note 15, at 83. 
17. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE 204 (1975); cf. Friedman, supra note 12, at 120. 
18. Since Québec has adopted most aspects of the adversarial system 
regarding its civil litigation procedures and its class action procedure, this latter 
issue is less critical to my study, however.  See, e.g., W.A. Bogart et al., Class 
Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional Society? 
(2007), Report prepared for The Globalization of Class Actions Conference, 
Oxford University, December 2007, at 1, available at: 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Canada_Na
tional_Report.pdf  (last visited September 26, 2009).  See also, Jutras, supra 
note 4, at 3, citing JEAN-MAURICE BRISSON, LA FORMATION D’UN DROIT MIXTE : 
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA PROCÉDURE CIVILE DE 1774 À 1867 (Thémis 1986). 
19. See, e.g., John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Resisting Cross-
Jurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on “Legal Processes and National 
Culture”, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 52-53 (1997). 
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American level?  While each nation has a legal culture,20 there 
exists both “a convergence and divergence of cultures” which 
“[pulls] against the concept of national culture.”21  In Canada, for 
example, there is both a convergence of provincial cultures, 
evidenced by the legislative uniformity in some areas of the law,22 
and a divergence of cultures, evidenced by the specificity of 
certain provincial legal systems.23  This duality makes Canadian 
legal culture hard to define.  Another difficulty with the concept of 
national legal culture is the fact that there is a plurality of legal 
cultures, as complex as the society it is associated with.24 
Setting aside these difficulties, I will, in this paper, refer to 
culture as including the ideas, values and norms conveyed by the 
American and Canadian societies and their state institutions.  I will 
argue that their culture influences the development of the class 
action (as a disputing institution) and is influenced by it.  When 
feasible and relevant, I will also nuance national legal culture and 
provincial or state legal culture–distinguishing civil law culture 
from the common law culture.  
 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE 
 
A. Is there a “Modern Legal Culture”? 
 
Law must reflect the currently accepted values, customs and 
habits of society to be deemed appropriate, acceptable, and 
legitimate, and to be obeyed by its citizens.25  It must adapt to 
social and cultural changes, and must evolve and be reformed to 
reflect the contemporary, modern legal culture. Princeton 
                                                                                                             
20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 209.  
21. Jackson, supra note 19, at 57. 
22. See, e.g., Uniform Law Conference of Canada Website, available at 
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/ (and in particular, list of uniform legislation) (last 
visited September 26, 2009).  
23. See, notably, the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, (S.Q., 1991, c. 64.) 
[“C.C.Q.”], which codifies the civil law in the province of Québec. 
24. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, 
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 96, 213 (Harvard University Press 1990). 
25. On this point, see: Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness 
of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25:4 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
983 (2006). 
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anthropology professor Lawrence Rosen has argued that law is 
inherent to culture, and culture to law: 
Law is [a] cultural [domain].  Like the marketplace or the 
house of worship, the arrangement of space or the 
designation of familial roles, law may possess a distinctive 
history, terminology, and personnel.  But even where 
specialization is intense, law does not exist in isolation.  To 
understand how a culture is put together and operates, 
therefore, one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law, 
one cannot fail to see it as part of culture.26  [emphasis 
added] 
Most Western legal theorists interested in legal culture have 
presumed that law takes its source in society’s culture, that it is a 
“mirror” of society that operates to maintain social order.27  This 
so-called “mirror theory” provides that “[l]egal systems do not 
float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social 
context; necessarily, they reflect what is happening in their own 
societies.  In the long run, they assume the shape of these societies, 
like a glove that molds itself to the shape of a person’s hand.”28  
The mirror theory has been challenged, however, notably by 
Alan Watson and his legal transplants theory.29  According to 
Watson, the laws of one society are primarily borrowed from other 
societies; these laws are developed by transplantation of legal rules 
between legal systems, or by elaboration and application of 
existing legal ideas to other systems by analogy to new 
circumstances.30  Hence, Watson essentially argues that law is 
insulated or autonomous from its society.  Watson’s theory was 
criticized by Otto Kahn-Freund, who argued that law is so deeply 
                                                                                                             
26. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 4-5 (Princeton 
University Press 2006).  Rosen ends his book by stating that “as a marvelous 
entry to the study of that most central of human features, culture itself, and 
hence an open invitation, whatever one’s ultimate interests, to think about what 
and who we are.” Id. at 200. 
27. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND 
SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001). 
28. Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of 
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996).  
 29. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW  (2d ed., University of Georgia Press 1993). 
30. Id. 
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embedded in a society’s life that it is not possible to effect a legal 
transplantation.31 
Studying legal culture is crucial to a better understanding of 
law and of our legal institutions.32  Indeed, cultural context 
explains why certain legislative choices are made.  It also helps 
interpret laws and regulations, and justifies precedent.  Legal 
culture determines “when, why and where people use law, legal 
institutions, or legal process; and [why] they use other institutions 
or do nothing.”33  It is essential to understanding how law works, 
and hence, crucial to the development of law reform: 
. . . law reform is doomed to failure if it does not take legal 
culture into account . . . legal systems are products of 
society–more specifically, of legal culture; hence reform is 
a subtle and complex task.  One has to take into account the 
limits imposed by culture; one has to re-examine whether 
the ‘failures’ of law are real failures, or whether we are 
neglecting to cut with instead of against the grain.34 
If a given society’s values, ideas, and norms change, its legal 
system will also change.  But is it merely law that moulds itself to 
culture, or can culture also mould itself and be influenced by law?  
There is most certainly a reciprocal influence between class action 
law and culture.  Since culture is important to law and law to 
culture, and since culture evolves through time and place, there is 
such a thing as a modern legal culture or “legal culture of 
modernity.”35  In this paper, I will focus on the modern cultural 
construction of legality, referring to legal developments and 
activity from the last few decades in North America. 
 
                                                                                                             
31. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. 
L. REV. 1 (1974).  See also, Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in 
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. 
REV. 12 (1998). 
32. Roger Cotterrell, Law in Culture, 17:1 RATIO JURIS 1 (2004) (arguing 
for the use of a “sociologically-informed concept of community” in legal 
theory); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (University of Chicago 
Press 1999); Friedman, supra note 12, at 130. 
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 76 
(Prentice Hall 1977). 
34. Id. at 130. 
35. Id. at 120. 
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B. Culture and Civil Procedure 
 
Civil procedure is culturally constructed.  Civil procedure law 
and its disputing institutions contain elements of tradition, 
common values and ideas that are attributable to identifiable 
cultures.  Legal academics have demonstrated an interest in this 
relationship since the turn of the twentieth century.  Austrian 
proceduralist Franz Klein argued in 1901, that “the squalid, arid, 
neglected phenomenon of civil procedure is . . . strictly connected 
with the great intellectual movements of peoples; and that its 
varied manifestations are among the most important documents of 
mankind’s culture.”36  
Decades later, in the early 1970’s, Mauro Cappelletti published 
a seminal article discussing the relationship between culture and 
civil procedure.37  In it, he reflected on the intellectual and socio-
political background of European civil procedure reforms, and 
underlined the importance for proceduralists of a cultural study of 
law.38  A few years later, William Felstiner also wrote about the 
influences of social organization on dispute processing, and argued 
that dispute processing practices are a product of society’s “values, 
its psychological imperatives, its history and its economic, political 
                                                                                                             
36. As quoted by Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886. 
37. Id.  See also Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through 
the Courts: A Comparativist’s Contribution, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 643 (1975); 
Mauro Cappelletti,  La protection d’intérêts collectifs et le groupe dans le 
procès civil, 27 R.I.D.C. 571 (1975); Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of 
Dispute Institutions in Society, LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 217 (1974).  Cappelletti also 
later wrote a treatise, MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (OUP 1989), in which he argued in favour of a 
“world-wide metamorphosis of the judicial process [in which] new types of 
procedures, and indeed new roles and responsibilities for judges, have 
emerged.”  Id. at xx.  This has meant, according to Cappelletti, that “procedural 
analysis must become ‘contextual’ analysis, for rules, institutions, and processes 
must be seen in their societal and political contexts.”  Id.  
38. Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886 (“Procedure is not pure form. It is the 
meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas . . .  Procedure is, in fact, the 
faithful mirror of all of the major exigencies, problems and trials of our epoch–
of the immense challenge of our time.”).  Antoine Garapon also wrote about 
law’s relationship to culture in: GARAPON, supra note 4, at 149 (“la procédure 
est le conservatoire de l’esprit national, plus encore que le fond du droit.”); 
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17-37. 
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and social organization.”39  In his important book entitled The 
Faces of Justice and State Authority,40 Mirjan Damaška similarly 
argued that procedural systems reflect the “structure of 
government” and the “purpose to be served by the administration 
of justice.” 41  
In his recently published book on law and culture–Law, 
Culture and Ritual42–Oscar Chase similarly argues that society’s 
choice of dispute resolution procedures results from the choices it 
makes according to its social structure, tradition and collective 
beliefs, according to its culture: 
Dispute processes are in large part a reflection of the 
culture in which they are embedded; they are not an 
autonomous system that is predominantly the product of 
insulated specialists and experts.  More, they are 
institutions through which social and cultural life is 
maintained, challenged, and altered, or as the same idea has 
been expressed, ‘constituted’ or ‘constructed.’  These 
institutional practices importantly influence a society and 
its culture–its values, metaphysics, social hierarchies and 
symbols–even as those practices themselves reflect the 
society around them.43  [emphasis added]  
Using the example of the Azande Society living in Central 
Africa, Chase argues that ways of resolving disputes both reflect 
the cultures in which they arose and affect these cultures.  He 
argues that the Azandes’ belief system of witchcraft, oracles, and 
magic used in their dispute resolution practices is reflective of the 
main features of the Azande Society.  In his view, the Azande 
                                                                                                             
39. William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute 
Processing,  9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 63 (1974). 
40. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: 
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale University Press 
1986).  
41. Id. at 1-15.  See also, Mirjan R. Damaška Rational and Irrational Proof 
Revisited, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 25 (1997). 
42. CHASE, supra note 11.  See also, on the relationship between law and 
culture: Oscar G. Chase, American ‘Exceptionalism’ and Comparative 
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Chase, supra note 13; Oscar G. 
Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil Procedure 
Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997). 
43. CHASE, supra note 11, at 2. 
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disputing institutions and practices mirror the hierarchical and 
gender-biased nature of Azande culture.44  He explains that: 
[t]he processes the Azande used for resolving their disputes 
were a link in a circular chain from belief to authority to 
action and back to belief: the central role of the oracle as a 
fact finder supported their system of social stratification, 
their ideas about appropriate gender relations, and their 
metaphysics.  This is the ‘lesson’ of the Azande.45 
In his book, Chase focuses on “official” outcome-determining 
processes, as opposed to settlement, which he characterizes as an 
“informal process.”46  I, on the contrary, will discuss class action 
trial and judgment, as well as the class action’s most likely 
outcome: settlement.  North American class action settlements are 
subject to court approval47 and are, in my view, hardly 
“informal.”48  Furthermore, class action litigation and settlement 
are equally important and relevant to culture.  In a way similar to 
Chase’s main thesis, I will demonstrate the cultural construction of 
North American class actions as dispute resolution institutions. 
 
IV. THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLASS ACTION LAW 
 
A. The Class Action’s Nature Encourages the Transmission of 
Culture 
 
The class action is a peculiar procedural mechanism that 
encourages, by its inherent structure and function, the 
communication of elements of culture.  It is defined as: 
. . . a legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of 
the claims) of a number of persons against the same 
                                                                                                             
44. Id. at 22-29. 
45. Id. at 29. 
46. Chase justifies his choice as follows: “I focus on the ‘official’ outcome-
determining processes precisely because their grounding in culture–and their 
constructive power–has been wrongly ignored or denied . . .  Informal processes 
also reflect social hierarchy, norms, and metaphysics and no doubt capture 
different ingredients of culture than the formal processes . . .”  Id. at 31. 
47. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C), which establishes that a class 
action settlement must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved 
judicially.  
48. This procedure will be further discussed below, in IV.C.3. 
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defendant to be determined in the one suit.  In a class 
action, one or more persons (‘representative plaintiff’) may 
sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of 
other persons (‘the class’) who have a claim to a remedy 
for the same or a similar alleged wrong to that alleged by 
the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share 
questions of law or fact in common with those of the 
representative plaintiff (‘common issues’).  Only the 
representative plaintiff is a party to the action.  The class 
members are not usually identified as individual parties but 
are merely described.  The class members are bound by the 
outcomes of the litigation on the common issues, whether 
favourable or adverse to the class, although they do not, for 
the most part, take any active part in that litigation.49 
This definition suggests a class action structure that is 
eminently social, in a way that encourages sharing elements of 
culture.  Indeed, the class action involves several different actors: a 
class action representative, class action lawyers for the plaintiff(s) 
and defendant(s), class members, and one (or more) judge(s).  
These actors each have values, ideas, and beliefs they will 
implicitly or explicitly disclose during the course of informal 
discussions, argument, or judgment.  In fact, each party will share 
not just its legal arguments and vision, but also, a set of norms.  
These norms will be apparent from the questions of law or fact 
shared by class members and the class representative.  Ultimately, 
the judge will decide upon the values, ideas, beliefs, and norms 
that should be upheld.50 
                                                                                                             
49. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL 
SYSTEMS–A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (Hart Publishing 2004). See also, 
Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941). 
50. Many authors, however, have argued that class action litigation is 
dominated by class counsel: John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of 
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large 
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-900 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory 
for Private Enforcement of Law Though Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-678 (1986); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class 
Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. 
L. REV. 646, 659-663 (1994). See also, Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The 
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. 
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The class action was originally created–and later used–in 
England, as a result of the country’s social, economic, political 
structures, and relations “transition[ed] from feudal arrangements 
to a more mercantile framework.”51  Indeed, as University of 
Miami law Professor Francisco Valdes explains:  
In the process of that macro-transition in English society, 
powerful institutions and actors, principally the clergy and 
the aristocracy, sought to exact from the local population–
the commoners–the tithes and similar types of payments 
based on entrenched feudal traditions.  The people resisted 
and the Lords, the powerful, and the clergy turned to the 
law.  But of course, it was difficult, cumbersome, and 
expensive to go after every little amount due from every 
single little labourer or parishioner.  So the powerful sought 
to go after the whole class of commoners who owed them 
something under the legal customs and traditional habits of 
feudalism.  The courts permitted it, and thus established the 
foundations of the class action. . . .  
The class action was invented to aid the powerful in 
maintaining the social and economic status quo vis-à-vis 
the disempowered.52 
Accordingly, the class action serves to allow several persons to 
take action as a group, changing individual disputes into group 
disputes, generating power relations,53 and encouraging the 
transmission of culture.  Indeed, it gives the class a chance to 
develop into “an independent force for change.”54  This “force for 
                                                                                                             
 
LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1991).  
Accordingly, the power of the class action would then be vehicled through class 
counsel’s arguments and actions. 
51. Valdes, supra note 4, at 630. 
52. Id. 
53. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION 1(Yale University Press 1987)  (“The very decision to 
recognize the claimants as a class–a temporary litigative entity–grants them a 
form of power.”). 
54. Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 
26:2 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 237, 256 (1992).  See also, Catherine Piché, The 
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change” will not only generate elements of culture, but it will 
allow for their communication and publication through precedent, 
and, when the class action invites publicity, the mass media.  
 
B. The Modern History of the North American Class Action 
Evidences Close Ties with Culture 
 
In this subsection, I will argue that each of the major stages of 
the more recent historical evolution of the North American class 
action evidences a close relationship with cultural developments in 
the U.S. and Canada.  
The first stage of modern class action history begins with the 
birth of the modern-day class action in 1966, as Rule 23 of the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted.55  Rule 23 was a 
significant milestone in the evolution of collective litigation 
because it provided guarantees of procedural fairness for 
defendants and absent class members, a system of notice to the 
latter class members, and opt-out procedures.56  The motivations 
behind its enactment were varied.  Certain legal scholars explained 
that its enactment responded to social and cultural upheavals of the 
1960’s: 
. . . the race relations echo of that decade was always in the 
committee room.  If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of 
the committee, the energizing force which motivated the 
whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class 
action system which could deal with civil rights and, 
explicitly, segregation.  The one part of the rule which was 
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the 
spirit of the times, we might well have had no rule at all.  
The other factor is that 1964 was the apogee of the Great 
Society.  President Johnson was elected with the most 
overwhelming vote ever, as of that time, achieved by 
anyone.  A spirit of them versus us, of exploiters who must 
                                                                                                             
 
Power of Class Actions, 2:1 CRITICAL ISSUES IN JUSTICE AND POLITICS 77 
(2009). 
55. See Catherine Piché, supra note 54, at 77. 
56. H. Patrick Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 262, 266 (1986). 
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not exploit the whole population, of a fairly simplistic good 
guy–bad guy outlook on the world, had its consequences.57 
Other legal scholars, such as Professor Judith Resnik, saw the 
new rule as having been enacted to respond to the legal 
community’s desire to rid of the “confusing” tripartite class action 
classification as true, hybrid, or spurious.58  While the Advisory 
Committee considered adopting a unitary standard of 
classification, it ultimately preserved the different forms of class 
actions.59  For the first few years after its enactment, Rule 23 
generated criticism and controversy, as companies’ legal exposure 
grew and consumers became more litigious than ever with the 
availability of this new procedural tool.60  Antitrust, consumer, 
environment, securities, and fair employment class actions were 
criticized, as they “resounded with Great Society concerns.”61 
Whilst Americans abundantly criticized the class action device, 
the Canadian province of Québec sought, in 1978, to replicate Rule 
23 by enacting class action legislation.62  Québec’s legislation was 
                                                                                                             
57. John P. Frank, “Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on 
Class Actions: Memorandum to My Friends on the Civil Rules Committee,” 
(December 20, 1996), in Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2 Working 
Papers of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to 
Rule 23, 266 (1997), as cited in DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (RAND 2000), 
available at,  http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR969  (last 
visited September 26, 2009).  See also, Valdes, supra note 4, at 640  (“ . . .  the 
modern class action is an artifact of modernity itself, shaped by the forces of 
social, economic, and political modernization: the emergence and consolidation 
of “mass” societies.”). 
58. Judith Resnik, From ‘Cases’ To ‘Litigation’, 54 LAW  & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 5, 8 (1991). 
59. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at n.16. 
60.  Id. at 15 et seq. 
61. Id. at n. 36. 
62. Loi sur le recours collectif/An Act Respecting the Class Action, LQ 
1978, c. 8, enacting articles 999-1052, Code of Civil Procedure.  For accounts of 
the history of the Canadian class action, see: Andrew Borrel, The Evolving 
Evidentiary Standard for Certification in Canada, 26:6 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 
3 (2005); Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE 
COMP. & INT’L L. J. 269 (2001); W.A. Bogart, Questioning Litigation’s Role–
Courts and Class Actions in Canada, 62 IND. L. J. 665 (1986-87); Williams, 
Consumer Class Actions in Canada–Some Proposals for Reform, 13 OSGOODE 
HALL L. J. 1 (1975); John A. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada,  11 OSGOODE 
HALL L. J. 397 (1973). 
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a first in Canada.  It contained extensive provisions addressing 
interlocutory rights of appeal, the forms of collective recovery, and 
the conduct of the lawsuit.63  It also provided a preliminary 
screening of the case’s merits–at the so-called “authorization” 
stage–and established a governmental agency for the distribution 
of public funds to potential class action representatives.64  
The advent of the class action in the Canadian province of 
Québec evidenced a similar concern for culture.  The Québec 
legislation was enacted under the Parti Québécois government 
headed by René Lévesque, with policy objectives of promoting and 
favouring access to justice, and more efficiently enforcing social 
and remedial legislation.  The legislation was a measure intended 
to advance a public interest agenda, along with labour reform and 
consumer protection statutes.65  Member of the National Assembly 
Fernand Lalonde described it as advancing a “social purpose:” 
On behalf of the Official Opposition, we are very satisfied 
with the tabling of Bill 39 respecting the class action.  The 
bill has a social purpose, and is destined to re-establish a 
balance between the isolated citizen and companies, 
especially the enormous ones with which our society has 
become familiar.  This bill will provide the citizen with a 
tool destined to eliminate the imbalance which sometimes 
exists between the consumers and producers of goods . . . 66  
[emphasis added] 
In the rest of Canada, class action reform followed in 1982, 
with the publication of the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
Report on Class Actions.67  In this report, the Ontario Commission 
identified three objectives for future lawmakers to consider.  First, 
class actions should ensure judicial economy, because without 
                                                                                                             
63. Glenn, supra note 56, at 267.  In Québec, interlocutory rights of appeal 
are limited. 
64. Id. at 267. 
65. Shaun Finn, In a Class all its Own: The Advent of the Modern Class 
Action and its Changing Legal and Social Mission, 2(2) CAN. CLASS ACTION 
REV. 333 (2005). 
66. Id. at 352-353 (citing Journal des débats, Troisième session-31ème 
Législature: audition des mémoires sur le projet de loi no. 39 (le 7 mars 1978) 
B-262). 
67. 1-3 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 
(Ministry of the Attorney General 1982). 
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them, “most of [the] claims would be litigated individually, leading 
to duplicative and costly hearings, at least in situations where there 
are too many potential plaintiffs for joinder to be feasible.”68  
Second, class actions should facilitate access to justice.  Third, 
class actions should enable behavioural modification or 
deterrence.69  Ultimately, the Ontario Commission recommended 
that to meet these objectives, provinces adopt a class certification 
procedure similar to U.S. Rule 23.70  
The Report’s recommendations and statement of class action 
objectives is consistent with early legal culture.  Indeed, the 
Canadian civil justice system is “premised on the maintenance of 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and accessibility 
to the civil justice system.”71  It is a legal system that strives to 
remain not only accessible, but “effective, fair, and efficient.”72  
The Ontario Report’s three class action objectives of access to 
justice, judicial economy and efficiency, and deterrence are 
consistent with the latter civil justice objectives and fundamental 
precepts of Canadian legal culture. 
Another stage of Canadian class action history was marked by 
the 1983 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Naken.73  This case 
slowed judicial acceptance and expansion of class actions, 
requiring that collective proceedings be filed only pursuant to 
properly enacted provincial legislation.  By this judgment, the 
                                                                                                             
68. Id. at 118-119.  
69. Id. at 145-146 (“. . . the potential of class actions to provide the 
incentives for increased compliance with the law, through the prevention of 
unjust enrichment or cost internalization, reinforces the ‘judicial economy’ and 
‘access’ arguments in favour of the adoption of an expanded class action 
procedure in Ontario.”). 
70. Bogart, supra note 62, at 692.  What the Commission recommended, 
however, was that rather than a separate requirement that common questions 
predominate over the individual ones, courts consider predominance as just “one 
of the factors employed to gauge whether the class action is superior.”  Id. 
71. THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SYSTEMS OF CIVIL JUSTICE TASK 
FORCE REPORT 15 (August 1996). 
72. Id. at 15, 26  (“These principles lie at the heart of civil justice and 
cannot be imperiled.  The principles of equity and access are also central.  The 
maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ and assertions that ‘justice is only for 
the rich’ are warning signals.  To avoid a dichotomy between ‘perfect’ justice 
and ‘accessible’ justice, we must recognize that there are different ways to 
achieve procedural fairness and incorporate this knowledge into our system.”). 
73. Naken v. General Motors of Canada (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385 
(S.C.C.). 
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Supreme Court responded to the then prevalent legal culture 
attributing a conservative role to the courts.74  In the years 
following Naken, the class action device was profusely criticized, 
notably for being a “new form of the arrêt de règlement . . . and a 
‘serious judicial usurpation of the functions of the legislature.’”75  
The enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,76 
however, gave more power to the courts, and brought hope that 
Canadian judges would be more receptive to class actions in the 
future.77 
In the mid-1990’s, a more enthusiastic stage of the modern 
North American class action history begun.  In Canada, two 
provinces enacted class action legislation in response to a new 
social impetus favouring collective rights.78  In the U.S., mass tort 
and personal injury class actions appeared in great numbers, as did 
settlement classes.79  Despite their enthusiasm about the class 
action device, Americans also became mindful of its pitfalls.  They 
grew concerned that it invited, notably, potential conflicts of 
                                                                                                             
74. W.A. Bogart, Naken, The Supreme Court and What Are Our Courts 
For?, 9 CAN. BUS. L. J. 280 (1984).  
75. H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions in Ontario and Quebec  62:3 CAN. BAR 
REV. 247, 270-73 (1984).  See also, H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions and the 
Theory of Tort and Delict,  35 U. TORONTO L. J. 287 (1985)  (arguing that class 
action is incompatible with tort and delict law); Glenn, supra note 56; Thomas 
Cromwell, An Examination of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on 
Class Actions, 15 OTTAWA L. REV. 587 (1983); W.A. Macdonald et al., Ontario 
Class Action Reform: Business and Justice System Impacts–A Comment, 9 CAN. 
BUS. L. J. 351 (1984). But see, Bogart, supra note 74, at 308  (“. . . I believe it is 
the class action . . . which will best answer the needs of group action at the end 
of the 20th century.”). 
76. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11. 
77. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 2-3. 
78. Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 and British 
Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50. See also, The Class 
Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01 (Saskatchewan); Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 
2001, c. C-18.1 (Newfoundland and Labrador); Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 
2003, c. C-16.6 (Alberta); Federal Court Rules, S.O.R./98-106 (Rules 334.1 et 
seq.). See also, The Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130 (Manitoba).  
Today, class action procedures have been implemented by most Canadian 
provinces. 
79. On this topic, see John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the 
Mass Tort Class Action,  95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); and more generally, 
John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000). 
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interest between plaintiff attorneys and class members, collusion 
between defendants and plaintiff attorneys, and unfair settlements 
which award lawyers thousands or millions of dollars in fees and 
the smallest amounts of money damages to plaintiffs.  These 
concerns lead to a renewed interest in class action rule revision and 
civil justice reform.80  
At the end of the decade, the battle over the utility of class 
actions in the U.S. continued,81 reflecting in great part, a 
fundamental cultural divide between proponents of individual 
versus group rights.82  Indeed, “clashing views on the objective of 
Rule 23(b)(3) [were] at the heart of past and present controversy 
over revising the class action rule.”83  Nevertheless, the policy 
behind the modern class action was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court as being to make “marketable” civil claims that otherwise 
would not realistically be brought on an individual basis.84 
The most recent stage of class action history begun in Canada, 
in early 2000, with a trilogy of class action Supreme Court cases.85  
In one of them, Dutton, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized 
the critical importance of class actions: 
The class action plays an important role in today’s world.  
The rise of mass production, the diversification of 
corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation, 
and the recognition of environmental wrongs have all 
contributed to its growth . . . The class action offers a 
                                                                                                             
80. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 22 et seq.   Notably of interest is the 
1995 Castano decision, in which a Louisiana district court certified a nationwide 
class action on behalf of smokers asking damages for addiction; see Castano v. 
American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).  But see, Castano v. 
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), which effectively 
overturned the trial court’s certification on interlocutory appeal.  
81. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 35-37. See also, Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 
(1996). 
82. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 49. 
83. Id. 
84. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting 
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
85. Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534, 
Rumley v. British Columbia, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 184 and Hollick v. City of 
Toronto, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 158. 
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means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner 
that is fair to all parties.86 
This favourable caselaw caused an increase in the number of 
class action filings in Canada, from 15 filings per year five years 
ago, to approximately 120-150 per year at present.87  It also 
brought high certification rates throughout Canada. Between the 
years 2002 and 2007, approximately 57% of all cases were 
authorized in Québec, compared to, certification rates of 52%, 75% 
and 45% in Ontario, British Columbia, and in the Federal Court of 
Canada, respectively.88 
By comparison, U.S. controversy over the class action led to 
three major class action law reforms–the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,89 Rule 23 amendments of 2003,90 
and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,91 which sought to 
tighten procedural protections to prevent abuse of the class action 
mechanism.  They also sought to regulate the selection of class 
counsel and limit their fees, encouraged interlocutory appeals, and 
limited settlement class actions and coupon settlements.  These 
reforms were implemented in response to a high level of mistrust 
of lawyers–especially class action ones–and of collective 
procedural mechanisms.92  Indeed, the PSLRA was adopted to “go 
after the greatest abuse . . . lawyers who do not represent the 
                                                                                                             
86. Dutton, at ¶ 26.  
87. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 16. 
88. Id. at 25-26. 
89. Pub. L.  No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C.) (“PSLRA”).  
PSLRA raised the standard of pleading for securities lawsuits and changed the 
selection process of class representatives and class counsel.  
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h) (as amended in 2003). 
91. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C.) (“CAFA”).  
CAFA significantly expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction over state law 
class actions.  Indeed, it allows federal jurisdiction over class actions based on 
minimal diversity and an aggregate amount in controversy of five million 
dollars, and removal by any defendant, even an in-state defendant.  See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (2), (6) (Supp. V. 2005) and § 1453 (b). The practical result of 
CAFA, accordingly, is to allow all large scale class actions to be filed or 
removed to federal court. 
92. Howard M. Erichson, Symposium: Fairness to Whom–Perspectives on 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008). 
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general public but represent themselves.”93  These reform efforts 
and steady concern for procedural abuse, however, have not 
affected the number of U.S. federal class action filings or 
removals, which have risen steadily over the last decade.94 
Accordingly, this most recent stage of class action history 
evidences, once more, a true concern for culture.  Indeed, in our 
mass production, mass consumption economy, concerns for 
procedural and contractual fairness and for product safety are now 
adequately and efficiently addressed by collective redress for 
breaches in various areas of the law such as tort, consumer 
protection, or contract law.  
 
C. The Class Action as a “Mirror of Societal Structure” and 
Culture 
 
The class action was created in parallel to a decline in the 
individualist conceptions of trial and justice.95  It is, and will likely 
remain, closely tied to its social and cultural setting.96  W.A. 
Bogart argued a quarter of a century ago that the class action 
“[reflects] how society functions” and “[mirrors] societal 
                                                                                                             
93. Statement to Congress of Senator d’Amato, quoted in Howard M. 
Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 
1603 (2008).  
94. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS 
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
2 (2007).  This Report explains that there was a 46% increase in federal court 
class actions filings or removals during six-month periods from mid-2001 
through mid-2006.  
95. Cappelletti, “La protection”, supra note 37, at 596. 
96. See Yeazell, supra note 53, at 267  (“This chapter, like the entire study, 
argues that one cannot understand the nature of group litigation separate from 
the social setting that produces and the state that permits and regulates it.”); 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of 
the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 895-896 (1977)  (“. . . the interaction 
between group and law in the earliest reported instances of group litigation 
reminds us that the law’s position as a social artifact, and the courts’ function as 
agencies of social and economic control, preclude easy assumptions that 
formally similar procedural devices play similar roles in different social 
circumstances.”). 
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structure.”97  He also argued that class actions respond to a 
collective vision of litigation because they: 
. . . allow litigation to be brought in a form responsive to 
questions concerning the activities of entities whose 
conduct can scarcely avoid having mass ramifications.  
And seeing alleged wrongdoing by these aggregates in the 
light of the consequences for groups is vital in order to 
assess and to respond to such conduct.  To force litigation 
to be brought on an individual basis is to embrace a vision 
of the structure of society which–and in many important 
ways, regrettably–no longer exists.  To force it into the 
traditional mold of litigation in the name of individualism 
may purport to celebrate formally the value of each one of 
us but, in reality, it prevents an effective means of 
confronting such aggregates with their capacity to pose a 
greater threat to that individuality.  
. . . [class actions] reflect a reality that sooner or later 
must be mirrored in litigation that affects so significantly 
the issues people bring to courts.  Canada is a highly 
industrialized and regulated society which will repeatedly 
generate policies, issues, and consequences that the courts 
can only respond to adequately by approaching them with 
an understanding of how powerful entities function and 
affect, and at times injure, groups and individuals.98   
[emphasis added].  
Relating the class action to the social and cultural environment 
in which it exists and operates is logical, considering the inherent 
structure and function of the class action.99  But this relationship is 
also questionable in the North American context. Canada has a bi-
juridical legal system in which common and civil law cohabitate 
and interact.  Its provinces and territories each have their own 
specific legal system and culture.  Quebec, however, has a mixed 
                                                                                                             
97. Bogart, supra note 74, at 280-281.  See also, Bogart et al., supra note 
18, at 2 (where Bogart links class action reform to culture and politics); Bogart, 
supra note 62, at 697 (“[c]lass actions claim our attention because they raise 
questions concerning how society is structured and run–the manner in which the 
nation struggles with the problems that a highly industrialized and regulated 
country must face at the close of the twentieth century.”). 
98. Bogart, supra note 62, at 699-700. 
99. See IV.A. 
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jurisdiction, in which criminal law and several other federal 
matters are derived from the common law, while most other areas 
of the law are codified and of civil law facture.  The United States 
has one state–Louisiana–and one territory–Puerto Rico–that are 
governed for a large part by civil law.  In addition, many of its 
southwest states such as Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada 
were originally Mexican territory, and have inherited several 
unique features from the civil law, which applied when they were 
part of Mexico.  
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue in favour of a unified, truly 
Canadian or American legal culture.  This difficulty is accentuated 
by the fact that social, political, economical and cultural 
developments in the United States reciprocally influence those of 
Canada, in part because the two countries share a common border, 
language, and cultural heritage.  In the class action context, U.S. 
legal developments also influence the development of Canadian 
law.  And since the Canadian and American class action regimes 
are similar (though not identical), they are subject to a constant 
cross-fertilization of ideas.  
Setting aside these difficulties, North American class action 
law developments in the last decade have been, and will likely 
continue to be, culturally constructed.  This influence can be 
appreciated in light of the three following characteristics of North 
American contemporary culture: (1) access to justice; (2) 
managerial judging; and (3) the preference for settlement.  
 
1.  Access to Justice 
 
This first cultural characteristic of access to justice is a 
principal objective of the North American civil justice system, and 
is reflected in North American class action developments.  In 2006, 
then Chief Justice of Ontario Roy McMurtry explained that 
[t]here is no doubt that the provision of civil justice is 
integral to a viable democratic society.  As you know, our 
system of civil justice is premised on the maintenance of 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the 
openness of the courts, and it can be described as having 
two overarching objectives: (1) to provide Canadians with 
a means by which they can resolve their disputes peacefully 
and in a timely way before an independent and impartial 
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decision-maker; and (2) to ensure that this public dispute 
resolution “machinery” is accessible to all Canadians, both 
in terms of cost and complexity.100  [emphasis added] 
Accordingly, access to justice is the foundation of Canada’s 
civil society and a major concern of civil justice.  It is an important 
element of Canadian culture. Indeed, “in a liberal democracy, all 
people should have an equal right to participate in every institution 
where law is debated, created, found, organized, administered, 
interpreted and applied.”101  Access to justice is considered to be 
not a goal, but a “process,” a “positive act of creating a more just 
society,” an “empowerment that citizens claim for themselves.”102  
Consequently, it is also the “principal justice challenge” for the 
future.103 
Access to justice is, similarly, a fundamental right of primary 
concern in American civil justice.  It is central to achieving 
democracy in civil processes. Access to justice is implicit in the 
principle of “equal justice under law:” “[t]he underlying 
assumption is that social justice is available through procedural 
justice.  [But] those who receive their ‘day in court’ do not always 
feel that ‘justice has been done’ . . . Formal rights can be 
prohibitively expensive to enforce, successful plaintiffs can be 
informally blacklisted, and legislatures may overturn legal rulings 
that lack political support.”104  Currently, U.S. civil processes fail 
to ensure that a lawyer is made available for each and every injured 
plaintiff, and that processes are fair and comprehensible to the 
average claimant.105  In fact, while access to justice has been 
                                                                                                             
100. R. Roy McMurtry, “Civil Justice Reform Conference: Phase II – Into 
the Future,” paper presented to the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, December 
7, 2006, available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006/mcmurtry-en.pdf (last visited 
September 26, 2009), at 4-5. 
101. Roderick A. Macdonald, “Access to Justice in 2003–Scope, Scale, 
Ambitions”,   paper   presented   to   the   Symposium   on Access   to Justice, 
May 2003, Law Society of Upper  Canada, available at 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convjune03_access.pdf (last visited September 26, 
2009), at 1. 
102. Id. at 6-7. 
103. McMurtry, supra note 100, at 3. 
104. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5-6 (OUP 2004). 
105. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1014 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles 
to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 369 (2003). 
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considered critical to Canadian policy debates and legal reform, it 
has been largely ignored in the United States.106 
In the class action context, access to justice is considered to be 
the most important prerequisite and benefit to the class action, and 
a principal objective of class action statutes.107  In Dutton, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that:  
. . . by allowing fixed litigation costs to be divided over a 
large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve access to 
justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that 
would otherwise be too costly to prosecute individually.  
Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to 
some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims. Sharing 
costs ensures that injuries are not left unremedied.108  
[emphasis added] 
Similarly, prominent American legal scholars have explained 
that: “. . . when Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was amended, . . . the class action device was given the potential 
broadly to affect access to court.  That appears to have been one of 
the goals of the 1966 amendments.”109  
Without the economy of scale that class actions afford, many 
individuals would otherwise be without recourse because their 
claim is too small, complex, or risky to be adjudicated 
individually.110  The Supreme Court of Canada Naken case,111 for 
example, was one where the plaintiffs could not have sued other 
than collectively.  Indeed, the cost of proving the validity of the 
claim of manufacturing or design defects in automobile products 
was too high to have the claim adjudicated individually, 
particularly since no personal injury had resulted.  
                                                                                                             
106. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 1013 (“Few issues are more central to our 
legal system and more neglected in our legal policy debates than access to 
justice.”). 
107. See, notably, Hollick, supra note 85, at ¶ 19. See also, ONTARIO LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 139 (“effective access to justice is a 
precondition to the exercise of all other legal rights”). 
108. Dutton, supra note 85, at ¶ 28. 
109. Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in 
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 
684 (1997). 
110. See, e.g., Developments–The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1752, 1806-1807 (2000). 
111. Naken, supra note 73. 
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Judges and legal academics have confirmed that the use of the 
class action promotes and furthers access to justice.112  
Accordingly, since the class action is fundamentally influenced by 
one of the principal elements of North American legal culture–
access to justice–it is also reflective of culture. 
 
2. Managerial Judging 
 
A second facet of class action law that evidences a concern for 
cultural context is the evolution of the role of the judge toward 
increased managerial judging.  In the last decade, legal culture in 
North America–and elsewhere–has required that judges become 
active managers of increasingly more complex cases.  Class action 
law in Canada and in the U.S. has responded to this cultural 
context by providing–and sometimes mandating–more active 
judicial management in group proceedings. 
Traditionally, the judicial system provided that parties to a 
dispute controlled its progress, subject only to a loose control by 
the courts, the whole in conformity with the adversarial 
                                                                                                             
112. Current Chief Justice of Ontario Warren K. Winkler recognized the 
access to justice function of class actions in a speech on April 30, 2008 (“Class 
proceedings have created the opportunity for minor lawsuits, which would be 
completely impractical if advanced on an individual basis, to be clustered 
together and carried forward by experienced, motivated lawyers.  Many 
legitimate claims, which would never have been brought forward otherwise, 
have been recognized and addressed by the courts.”): Warren K. Winkler, 
“Access    to    Justice–Remarks”,    paper     presented   at   the   Canadian  Club   
of London, April 30, 2008, available at  
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/accessjustice.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2009).  See also Valdes, supra note 4, at 649 (“[t]hroughout the 
zigs and zags of time, the virtue of the class action was and is in the effort to 
provide access to justice–to deliver justice to those who don’t have access to 
justice.  It is the virtue that motivates and justifies the modern class action 
specifically.”); PIERRE-CLAUDE LAFOND, LE RECOURS COLLECTIF, LE ROLE DU 
JUGE ET SA CONCEPTION DE LA JUSTICE: IMPACT ET EVOLUTION 241 et seq. (Yvon 
Blais 2006)  (“La relative indifférence de la magistrature à l’égard de l’accès des 
citoyens aux tribunaux que d’aucuns lui reprochaient a cédé progressivement sa 
place à une plus grande conscience de la problématique et à un souci de l’égalité 
effective de tous devant le prétoire.”); Schweyer v. Laidlaw Carriers Inc. (2000), 
44 CPC (4th) 236 (SCJ), at ¶ 44 (where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
interpreted the Ontario CPA criterion of preferability to require that the 
determination of the common issues advance the proceeding in accordance with 
the Act’s objective of promoting access to justice.). 
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tradition.113  In recent years, however, this position has changed 
dramatically in Canadian and American jurisdictions, as new rules 
were enacted regarding case management, rules on pre-trial 
conferences, and other judicial activism measures.  Judges have 
become increasingly involved with parties in chambers, 
supervising case preparation and management, helping shape the 
litigation, and encouraging settlement.114  They have become 
“mediators, negotiators, and planners–as well as adjudicators.”115  
This contemporary judicial attitude is the result of a social and 
cultural trend characterized by Mauro Cappelletti as the 
“massification” of cases:  
Our contemporary society . . .  is frequently characterized 
as a “mass production–mass consumption” civilization.  
That characterization reflects, no doubt, a typical feature of 
modern economies in all parts of the world–
“massification.”  But this feature extends far beyond the 
economic sector; it characterizes social relationships, 
feelings and conflicts as well. 116 
As Cappelletti discusses, the new collective and social rights 
created as a result of this “massification” phenomenon require 
“active intervention by the state and other public entities.”117  
Judicial case management falls into this type of intervention. 
In the class action context, judges have revised their traditional 
role in litigation, becoming more actively involved in the 
prosecution of the class action, in part to protect absent class 
parties.118  Their new role has also been motivated by the 
                                                                                                             
113. Hugh F. Landerkin, Q.C. & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators: 
What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?, 82 CAN. BAR 
REV. 249 (2003); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in 
Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
114. Resnik, supra note 113, at 377-379. 
115. Id. at 379. 
116. Cappelletti, supra note 37. 
117. Id. at 646. 
118. Glenn, supra note 75, at 268-269; ONTARIO LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 445.  In fact, the class action represents a new 
model of litigation that requires a change in the court’s adjudicating role, 
because “[t]he nature of the right asserted based upon a mass harm, the 
representation of absentee members whose interests may not coincide in all 
respects and the need to protect those interests, the assessment and distribution 
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increasing size and complexity of class actions lawsuits–a similar 
“massification” of sorts of the class action, necessitating more 
“hands-on” management.119  As such, class action judges have 
become “active systems manager[s],”120 who are no longer neutral, 
passive, and aloof, but are rather, principally involved in the 
litigation.121  
Today, case management is provided for in legislation such as 
the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(12), which 
authorizes the judge to adopt “special procedures for managing 
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex 
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof 
problems.”  In Canada, Article 1045 of the Québec Code of Civil 
Procedure similarly gives judges broad judicial powers to hasten 
the progress of the class action or to simplify the proof, on the 
condition that they do not prejudice a party or the members.  A 
Québec class action division was also created in 2006 to help 
manage cases.  As for Canadian national class action cases, which 
require even greater management, courts have used their case 
management powers to coordinate class actions in different 
provinces that involve the same subject matter, with the explicit 
consent of the class action parties, lawyers, and judges involved.122  
                                                                                                             
 
of monetary relief in innovative ways as well as the fashioning of other relief, 
sometimes on the basis of competing representations within the class, and the 
procedural aspects of class actions such as the motion for certification, are all 
factors which can make the class action, both in appearance and performance, a 
clear departure from the traditional model of litigation.”  See Bogart, supra note 
74, at 303-304. See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976) (“I think it unlikely that the 
class action will ever be taught to behave in accordance with the precepts of the 
traditional model of adjudication.”). 
119. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 446. 
120. Glenn, supra note 75, at 269, quoting Arthur R. Miller, Of 
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the ‘Class 
Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667 (1979). 
121. Bogart, supra note 74, at 302. 
122. Bogart  et  al.,   supra   note   18,   at   21.    See   Ontario Court 
Practice       Direction      Number     8       for       proceedings         under       the  
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, available at 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/classproceedings.htm (last 
visited September 26, 2009) (“In accordance with the statutory scheme, the 
judge hearing the pre-trial motions will case manage the proceeding.”). 
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In sum, the emergence of the contemporary requirement of 
class action management is culturally constructed because it was 
motivated by the social and cultural phenomenon of 
“massification” of litigation in North America and around the 
world generally.   
 
3. The Preference for Settlement 
 
A third facet of class action law that evidences a concern for 
culture is the preference for settlement, as opposed to adjudication 
by trial and judgment.  
The recent decade in North America has seen a gradual decline 
in trial rates and a corresponding increase in the number of out of 
court settlements.123  This trend results from a combination of 
different factors: the costs of litigating are high and prohibitive, 
litigation is increasingly complex and lengthy, judges implicitly 
encourage parties to settle as they are overwhelmed by crowded 
court dockets, and there are growing numbers of lawyers able to 
achieve negotiated settlements.124  In Canada, for instance, there 
has indeed been such a decline in the number of yearly trials.125  
University of Wisconsin law professor Marc Galanter 
published several articles in which he discussed the disappearance 
of “[t]he promise of full-blown adjudication in a public forum, [or 
the] ‘day in court,’” in favour of “‘bargaining in the shadow of the 
                                                                                                             
123. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, ‘Most Cases Settle’: Judicial Promotion 
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1387 (1994) (95% of 
cases in the U.S. federal system are resolved prior to trial).  In Canada, see 
Donalee Moulton, “Vanishing Trials: Out-of-Court Settlements on the Rise,” 
THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, October 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=784 (last 
visited September 26, 2009). 
124. Marc Galanter, The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty 
Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (2005).  See also Judith Resnik, 
Migrating, Morphing and Vanishing: The Empirical Normative Puzzles of 
Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 3 (2004). 
125. See, e.g., conference papers from the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 
available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/publications/itf-en.php (last visited September 
26, 2009); Pierre Noreau, La justice est-elle soluble dans la procedure?–repères 
sociologiques pour une réforme de la procédure civile,  40 CAHIERS DE DROIT 
33 (1999). 
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law.’”126  Galanter attributed the gradual decline in trial rates to a 
transformation in the judicial culture: “a great increase in judicial 
case management at the early stages of litigation, a substantial 
increase in nontrial adjudication before judges, and a substantial 
dose of outsourcing to ADR providers . . .”127  He argued that the 
recent judicial ideology was about actively case managing and 
promoting settlements, and considered the primary role of courts to 
have grown to be “less enunciating and enforcing public norms and 
more facilitating resolution of disputes.”128 
In the class action context, statistics about the number of 
settlements, before or after certification, are scarce.  Even when 
statistics exist and are available, their accuracy and reliability is 
limited, given the fact that settlements of non-certified class 
actions are privately negotiated and completed, and do not need the 
court’s approval to be made effective.129  As such, the details of 
these private settlements are never scrutinized by the courts or the 
public.  
Nevertheless, existing statistics provide that trials are rare and 
out of court settlements, increasingly prevalent.130  In fact, it 
                                                                                                             
126. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 13 
(2006); Galanter, supra note 124, at 1264. 
127. Galanter, supra note 124, at 1265-1266. 
128. Id.  
129. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1)(e), which make clear that court 
approval is required for a settlement or voluntary dismissal only if the class 
action is certified.  In Canada, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador similarly allow the 
settlement of uncertified class actions without the approval of the court.  Ontario 
and New Brunswick, however, require the judicial approval of all settlements–
including those of uncertified class actions. See, e.g., Section 29 (2) of the 
Ontario Class Proceedings Act. 
130. W.K. Branch & J.C. Kleefeld, Settling a Class Action (or How to 
Wrestle an Octopus, in CANADIAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON LITIGATING 
TOXIC TORTS AND OTHER MASS WRONGS 2000 Tab XVI, 8-10 (Canadian 
Institute 2000); Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four 
Federal      District     Courts:   Final     Report     to   the   Advisory   Committee  
on Civil Rules, 1996, available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf (last 
visited September  26, 2009), at 60 (where the authors found that a substantial 
majority of certified class actions resulted in settlements.  The percentage of 
certified class actions ending in settlement ranged from 62% to 100%, while 
settlement rates for cases not certified ranged from 20% to 30%.).  See also 
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 (1991); Sylvia R. Lazos, 
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appears that only a “tiny fraction” of all class actions (certified or 
not) go to trial, a rate consistent with ordinary litigation.131  Class 
adjudication occurs mostly at the early stages of litigation, before 
trial, either by way of summary judgment or motion to dismiss, or 
after settlement was approved at the fairness hearing.132  Moreover, 
when a settlement does occur, there is a general tendency for 
courts to approve it without substantive changes,133 arguably in 
keeping with a certain inclination toward or preference for out of 
court settlements, as opposed to often lengthy and complex 
traditional court adjudication.  
                                                                                                             
 
Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian during 
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308 (1985). 
131. Nicholas M. Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America, 
(2007), report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference, 
Oxford University, December 2007, available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/USA__Nati
onal_Report.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009), at 91 (“Evidence suggests 
that the rate of trial may be lower than what might be seen in non-class litigation 
involving similar claims and defenses.  Evidence also suggests that outcomes 
other than trial or settlement are involved in a larger fraction of class actions 
than in non-class litigation.  In only those cases with certified class actions, class 
settlements are by far the most common result.”); Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 
21.  Bogart cites in footnote 99 a Québec author, Pierre-Claude Lafond, who 
compiled statistics for his book, and argued that in Québec, “there remain very 
few final judgments in class action cases.  The majority of class action cases end 
by out of court settlement.  From 1979 to 2004, 151 actions ended by way of 
settlement, against 32 judgments favourable to the class.  Therefore, more than 
three favourable outcomes out of four (82.5%) result in settlement.  Moreover, 
the data evidences the fact that more cases are organized at the stage of 
authorization than at the stage of the lawsuit’s origin or foundation, by a ratio of 
2 to 1 (98 against 53)” [translation].  See LAFOND, supra note 112, at 35.  Also 
see generally Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 79.  
132. See, e.g., Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 459, 487 (2004). 
133. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 
to Address Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 141 (1996) (In an 
empirical analysis of Rule 23 practiced in four American judicial districts, the 
authors found that “[a]pproximately 90% or more of the proposed settlements 
were approved without changes.”).  In Canada, there exists no such authority to 
my knowledge.  However, I can affirm, based on an extensive review of 
Canadian class action settlements conducted in the context of my doctoral thesis 
project, that Canadian courts do similarly tend to approve settlements without 
changes, and in fact do so quasi-automatically. 
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In both Canadian and American class action law, court 
approval is required to effect class action settlements.  The three-
part standard for such approval is the fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy of the proposed settlement as a whole.134  This standard, 
however, does not properly help determine what to look for when 
scrutinizing class settlements and assessing their fairness–or 
unfairness.  Hence, courts have developed several factors that they 
consider helpful and important in evaluating class settlement 
fairness.135  These factors are worded somewhat differently in the 
various states and provinces, yet they also contain indeterminate 
and subjective concepts that do not offer any account of the 
process judges should follow to review such settlements, or any 
indicia of which settlements should be approved or denied.  As 
such, the process by which settlement “fairness,” “reasonableness,” 
and “adequacy” of settlement is evaluated is very subjective, and 
depends on context–cultural context, notably.  
Relating class action settlements to their cultural context is 
complex, however, because settlements have many variables that 
affect their process.  They involve several actors with diverging 
                                                                                                             
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) establishes that a class action settlement 
must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved judicially.  By contrast, 
in Canada, there is no equivalent statutory provision, such that courts have had 
to develop a similar standard for the judicial oversight of class action 
settlements: Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance (1998) O.J. No. 1598 (Gen. Div.) at ¶ 
11. See also Killough v. Canadian Red Cross Society, (2007) B.C.J. No. 1262 
(B.C.S.C.); Rideout v. Health Labrador Corp., (2007) N.J. No. 292 (Nwfd’l and 
Lab. S.C.) at ¶ 138 (adding an element of “good faith” to the test); Sparvier v. 
Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) S.J. No. 752 (Sask. C.Q.B.); Pelletier c. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., REJB 1998-05914 (Qc.Sup.Ct.) at 10; Landry c. Syndicat du 
transport de Montréal, (2006) Q.J. no. 3043 (S.C.) (QL) at ¶ 31. 
135. American caselaw [Federal]: In re Prudential Insurance Co. America 
Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998); 
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463, 18 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 637 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (implied overruling on other grounds recognized by, U.S. Football 
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989)).  
Canadian caselaw: Dabbs, at ¶ 13; Jeffery v. Nortel Networks Corp., (2007) 
B.C.J. No. 90 (S.C.) at ¶ 18; White v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) B.C.J. No. 760 
(S.C.); Northwest v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) A.J. No. 1612 (Alta. C.Q.B.) at 
¶ 23 et seq.  See also, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, (Federal Judicial 
Center, 4th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/mcl4.pdf/$file/mcl4.pdf (last visited 
September 26, 2009), at 316, ¶ 21.62 (which lists the factors relevant to 
assessing class action settlement fairness). 
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interests, ideas, opinions, and values.  Moreover, the issue of 
settlement fairness differs in importance for the different actors 
and for the case at stake,136 and is very difficult to define.  As 
Rosen rightly argued, the meaning of concepts such as “fairness” 
will depend on “assumptions, reinforced across numerous 
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a part:” 
 . . . context is crucial: When we hear a court speak of “the 
conscience of the community,” “the reasonable man,” or 
“the clear meaning of the statute,” when we watch judges 
grapple with parenthood as a natural or functional 
phenomenon, or . . . we know that the meaning of these 
concepts will come not just from the experience of legal 
officials or some inner propulsion of the law but from those 
broader assumptions, reinforced across numerous 
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a 
part.  And when we seek law outside of specialized 
institutions—when a kinsman mediates a dispute or 
members of a settlement use gossip or an informal 
gathering to articulate their vision of society—the terms by 
which they grasp their relationships and order them will 
necessarily be suffused by their implications in many 
interconnected domains.137  
Ultimately, fairness remains a “pragmatic ideal,” and the 
fairness of procedures relative, because it “turns on the social ends 
that they serve.”138  In the same way, the fairness of class action 
procedure in the settlement context will depend on the social ends 
that class actions serve.  For example, in Epstein v. First Marathon 
Inc.,139 the Ontario Superior Court denied a class settlement 
because it arose from a strike suit.140  The Court used its powers 
under the Ontario CPA to refuse to allow the proposed settlement, 
because it would have provided no benefit to the proposed 
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shareholder class and a substantial payment to class counsel.  The 
Court held that the proposed settlement would make “a mockery” 
of the public policy upon which Ontario’s class action legislation is 
based and would be counter-productive to “the important policy 
objectives of the statute, . . . access to justice, judicial economy 
and behaviour modification.” 141  The Court further emphasized its 
disfavour of strike suits by barring the plaintiff lawyers from 
receiving any money by way of the settlement.  
Setting aside the Epstein case, very few class action settlements 
are refused in Canada, or asked to be modified for later approval.  
Most proposed settlements are accepted and approved “as is.”  
This tendency evidences a judicial preference for settlement, 
justified by Galanter’s argument of a transformation of the judicial 
culture in favour of fewer trials and more settlements.  
 
V. THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS ACTIONS ON NORTH AMERICAN 
LEGAL CULTURE 
 
Class actions typically involve important topics that have a 
significant impact on society.  They address issues such as product 
liability for defective pharmaceutical products,142 consumer 
protection for gambling activities,143 wrongful dismissals,144 or 
securities fraud.145  Where social harm is done to a large number of 
individuals, class actions are used to redress a large-scale public 
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wrong.  Society benefits from them because they promote the 
efficient use of judicial resources and help ensure greater 
compliance with laws and regulations, by making wrongdoers 
accountable for what they did, and encouraging behavioural 
modification.  
But do class actions also affect or influence culture?  Does 
class action reform effect changes in the way people live their 
lives; does it lead to cultural change?146  While a definite 
conclusion on these questions would ideally need to be supported 
by exhaustive qualitative data on the changing culture of litigation 
practices in North America, I believe that the answer is “yes.”  
Even without such data, I will argue below that evidence of this 
culture change can be found in, notably, a) the judicial institutions 
and the role of judges, and b) the legal profession. In subsection c), 
I will illustrate my argument that class actions influence culture by 
discussing the infamous Canadian national Residential Schools 
Settlement. 
 
A. The Judicial Institutions and the Role of Judges 
 
The emergence and increasing number of class action filings–
indicative of the popularity of the class action device–has 
influenced the organization and philosophy of judicial institutions, 
and has changed the role of judges involved in class action 
litigation.  Indeed, the class action device has required that courts 
be better organized, to manage more complex proceedings.  
Notably, these courts have created class action divisions or 
chambers, and have started using specific codes to refer to class 
proceedings in computerized court databases.  They have also felt 
the need to hire additional staff to manage the large amount of 
paperwork generated by the class action device.  In the Canadian 
province of Québec, for instance, the Fonds d'aide aux recours 
collectifs was created to help finance class action suits in first 
                                                                                                             
146. See, e.g., Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class 
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instance or on appeal, and to publish information about class action 
filings.  
In fact, the class action has required, by its complexity and 
physical volume, not just greater court organization, but better case 
management.  Furthermore, and as discussed in part above,147 the 
emergence and prevalence of the class action has influenced the 
role of judges in class action litigation, and along with it, their 
philosophy in handling such cases.  
For example, in the civil law system of Quebec, the advent of 
the class action has forced class action judges to move from a 
typically individualistic conception of justice, and of the class 
action, to a more collective one.  Indeed, the civil adjudicative 
process has traditionally been marked by a liberal political 
philosophy,148 in which the individual is free to sue or not sue, to 
defend himself or not, and during the course of litigation, to choose 
which terms and which procedural devices are ideal to argue his 
case and present the facts and law.149  As such, Quebec judges 
involved in class action litigation originally supported this purely 
individualistic conception of collective justice.150  These judges 
considered the class action to be a series of individual actions, an 
aggregate of individual claims which will be proven by the class 
representative.151  In recent years, however, they have begun 
setting aside the individualistic conception of the class action in 
favour of a more collective one, recognizing the collective 
dimension of the individual prejudice and the collective effect of 
the breach.152  Accordingly, the advent and evolution of the class 
action has, in that province, influenced legal culture because it has 
changed the judges’ conception of civil adjudication. 
Furthermore, in the United States, common law Canada, and in 
some European countries such as Belgium, Germany, and France, 
                                                                                                             
147.  See IV.C.2. 
148. Glenn, supra note 75, at 264. 
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(where he argues that “[e]ven the most sacred principles . . . must . . .  be 
reconsidered in view of the changed needs of contemporary societies. . . .  [A]n 
individualistic vision of procedural due process should give way to, or be 
integrated with, a social or collective concept of due process.”). 
151. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Québec (Proc. Gén.), (2002) 4 R.C.S. 429, 476-
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the class action has brought a “profound metamorphosis” in 
traditional judicial processes and philosophy.153  It has caused: 
. . . A real explosion of the traditional concepts, rules and 
structures of the judicial process . . . Standing to sue has 
been granted to ‘private attorney generals’ or ‘ideological 
plaintiffs,’ and such plaintiffs–hether individuals or 
organizations–have been regarded as the ‘adequate 
representatives’ of numbers and classes of people, most of 
whom might not even know that a ‘representative action’ is 
being brought ‘on their behalf.’  
. . .  
judges [must–and have–become] the protectors not only of 
the traditional individual rights, but also of the new diffuse, 
collective and fragmented rights and interests which are so 
characteristics of our mass civilization. . . . inevitably new 
powers and responsibility [have fallen] upon the 
judiciary.154 [emphasis added] 
 
B. The Legal Profession  
 
The class action has also brought changes in the culture of the 
legal profession. The prevalence of class action litigation and the 
higher settlement rates have changed the way lawyers interact with 
clients.  These lawyers have become “entrepreneurs,”155 seeking 
class action representatives actively, almost aggressively.  They 
continuously search for breaches in tort or contract that will make 
a collective suit opportune, interview potential class action 
representatives somewhat affected by the breaches, and file the 
lawsuit as quickly as possible. 
These entrepreneurial lawyers have also changed the way they 
interact with clients in both collective and unitary litigation.  
Lawyers now broach settlement very early on in the litigation.  
They also consider alternative dispute resolution favourably.  One 
reason for this culture shift is, possibly, the emphasis in Canadian 
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law schools on alternative dispute resolution and on informal 
judicial outcomes (such as settlement) in civil litigation.156  
Another reason for the cultural shift is the obvious potential for an 
earlier payment in attorney fees.  
 
C. One Example of the Class Action Influence on Culture: The 
Residential Schools Settlement 
 
I have argued above that class actions serve to influence or 
affect Canadian culture.  The recent Indian Residential Schools 
national class action and settlement serve to illustrate this 
argument.157  In this national class action, former students of 
recognized residential schools in Canada and their family members 
sued the Government of Canada and various church-related entities 
for harms and abuses that were committed against Aboriginal 
children.  The Indian residential schools at stake were schools 
supervised by the Federal Government, under policies that resulted 
in the removal of Aboriginal children from their families and 
communities, their assimilation through practices designed to 
extinguish their Aboriginal character, and upon graduation, their 
integration into a non-Aboriginal society.  In 2006, a Canada-wide 
settlement agreement was concluded regarding this class action, 
seeking to address the mental, spiritual, and physical harm done to 
the former students as a result of the practices of the residential 
schools.  
This national class action and its settlement were deeply 
influenced by culture.  Indeed, the Aboriginal students and their 
families–identified as the “Survivor Class,” estimated to number 
almost 79,000 persons–shared commonly held values, ideas, and 
norms that they brought forward by advancing class action claims.  
The settlement the students concluded considered the lasting and 
profound cultural effects of the residential schools legacy, and 
sought to bring closure and compensate the harm suffered by the 
Aboriginal community at large.  
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The class action and its settlement also sought to influence and 
probably influenced Canadian culture.  Part of the settlement 
provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, with a mandate to make a public and permanent 
record of the legacy of the schools, in conjunction with taking a 
significant portion of the settlement fund for healing and 
commemoration programs.  It led to a public apology to the 
Aboriginal people by Prime Minister Harper on June 11, 2008.158  
Hence, although there is no proven evidence yet of the effect of 
this settlement on Canadian citizens, the gigantic scope and 
specific, culturally-founded conditions of this national settlement 
most certainly affected–and will likely continue to affect–the ideas, 
beliefs, values, and norms of these citizens. 
 
VI. THE METHODOLOGY TO STUDY CLASS ACTION LAW 
 
Civil procedure is an extraordinarily fertile terrain for the 
cultural analysis of law and to learn about law’s place in culture.  
The analysis of class action objectives, effects, and trends affords a 
clearer understanding of legal culture, and vice versa.  But how can 
we best analyze these objectives, effects, and trends to ultimately 
support suggestions for reform in class action law?  What is the 
most efficacious methodology to obtain trustworthy data about the 
resolution of class action disputes by trial and/or settlement? 
In this paper, I have argued that class actions are procedural 
vehicles of great importance to our society.  They affect 
individuals, businesses, and society at large.  They affect 
developments in the substantive law, and in politics, and the 
economy.  Hence, finding the best methodology to study them is 
crucial, especially in a context where procedural reform is 
envisaged.  Indeed, since the legal system’s effectiveness is in 
great part dependant on citizens’ abidance to law and on their 
acceptance of the rules, efforts must be made to make this system 
coincide with contemporary social values and needs–and with 
modern legal culture.  
Legal theory, mostly in the form of doctrine, must be given 
significant weight in civil procedure reform.  Quantitative studies 
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based on the judicial outcomes of reported court cases and 
statistics based on these outcomes are also useful.  There are, 
however, many issues in civil procedure that can be more 
adequately addressed, discussed and eventually resolved with the 
use of empirical research.159  For instance, one way to assess 
whether the deterrence objective is met in a class proceeding is by 
empirically testing whether the defendant’s behaviour has changed 
since the lawsuit was filed.  Has the defendant changed its internal 
environmental policies, to prevent further toxic waste, for 
example?  In addition, the effectiveness of the class action–
notably, as a means of getting long-term benefits for particular 
groups160–can be evaluated with the use of empirical research.  
This type of research could, for instance, look into whether 
workers are, in fact, treated more fairly and equally by their 
company in the years following judgment in an employment 
discrimination class action case.  
One example of a study that brilliantly integrated both 
theoretical and empirical approaches to civil procedure in the class 
action law context is Bryant Garth’s analysis of concluded federal 
class actions from the Northern District of California.161  In it, 
Garth sought to assess critically the “‘social change’ impact of the 
class action.”162  Using case studies and interviews with class 
counsel and representatives, Garth organized the class actions he 
examined in three categories: Category A - Organizational efforts 
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with incidental clientele (including cases about overpayments of 
unemployment compensation and disability payment 
terminations); Category B -  Entrepreneurial lawyer with passive 
client (including cases about retail price fixing and price fixing to 
distributors); and Category C - Energetic and active plaintiffs 
(including Hispanic complaints against an employment test, 
employment discrimination against Blacks in retail sales, sex 
discrimination in employment promotions, etc.).  He concluded 
that the class action is a “politically empowered legal artifice” and 
that empirical research is relevant to the study of class action 
litigation because it examines, 
the impacts of the full range of empowering and 
nonempowering features of class action litigation . . . 
investigates particular revelations from discovery, the 
denial or granting of various motions in the case, the 
judges’ seeming attitude toward settlement or the merits, 
the shifting of legal theory or class representatives, or 
simply the effect of delay and inactivity; and it 
[investigates] how ground-level events affect the lawsuit.163 
In another interesting empirical study about class actions, New 
York University Professor Geoffrey P. Miller examined the 
veracity of the cultural stereotype that class actions are more 
popular in the Gulf States of Texas and Louisiana; that these two 
states are “favorite havens for plaintiffs’ attorneys and purgatory 
for the defense.”164   In his study, Miller wondered whether this 
description is true, whether there is indeed something different 
about class action practice in these two states, and if there are 
differences, what explains them.  The empirical evidence Miller 
reviewed derived from research conducted in various Westlaw 
databases, which essentially inquired as to the frequency of the 
term “class action” in the applicable data set.165  Before factoring 
in elements such as demographics, economic activity, and income 
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levels, Miller found that the class action explosion in the Gulf 
States could be explained by the data reviewed.166  But when the 
three factors were taken into consideration, his conclusion was 
more mitigated.  He found that: 
. . . when we control for population, a radical split occurs.  
Louisiana’s rate per capita is far above the national 
average, while Texas’s rate, even in recent years of 
increased class action litigation, is still below the national 
rate.  This result remains robust when we control for 
personal income; indeed, the position of Louisiana relative 
to other states becomes even more anomalous. Something 
very different is obviously occurring in these two states.167 
Interestingly, while Miller did not provide reasons for the 
patterns observed in Louisiana and Texas, his empirical analysis 
does not just explain developments in class action practice in these 
two states, but it serves to reinforce the link I have advocated 
herein between class action law and culture.  Indeed, Miller’s study 
supports the cultural stereotype that Louisiana is a class action 
“haven.”  Furthermore, his study is informed by the two-pronged 
research methodology I have supported, which contains both 




In this paper, I have argued that law is inherent to culture and 
culture to law.  I have extended this argument to the civil 
procedure and class action context.  My cultural construction of 
class action law has embraced two ideas: that the North American 
class action is a mirror of North American culture–in light of three 
of its principal characteristics of access to justice, managerial 
judging, and a preference for settlements–and that the class action 
influences culture–as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions 
and legal profession.  Finally, I have argued in favour of a two-
pronged analysis of class action law, which includes theoretical 
and empirical components. 
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Going back to the Hocking case,168 discussed in this paper’s 
introduction, serves to once again, reinforce my principal argument 
that law and culture reciprocally influence each other.  Indeed, in 
this case, the Quebec Court of Appeal was able to reaffirm a 
stricter standard of notice in class action law, and hence influence 
perceptions, opinions, ideas, and legal norms relative to class 
action law notice practices in Quebec and Ontario, and perhaps 
even throughout the country.  
Legal academics have suggested that legal systems are 
increasingly characterized by a certain apparent convergence that 
makes them evolve in parallel directions.169  In my view, these 
systems are also culturally constructed and thus distinguishable 
based on their specific legal cultures.  Are these two arguments 
reconcilable?  In the class action law context, there is a certain 
amount of convergence between systems, as previously discussed.  
But the convergence is limited by the particular legal system’s 
cultural specificities.  For instance, Europeans are still reluctant to 
make class proceedings widely acceptable, in part because their 
notions of the role of law and the client are fundamentally 
inconsistent with North American class action culture.170  
In conclusion, class action law systems will likely continue 
evolving at a steady pace.  They will also remain deeply influenced 
by and attached to legal culture.  In that way, they are like fast-
growing grain crops that must be planted, cultivated, and fertilized 
consistently with specific agricultural customs and traditions, for 
the most fruitful harvest. 
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